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Humphries: Myth of the Learning Curve

The Myth of the Learning Curve
Tactics and Training in the 12th
Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1916-18
Mark Osborne Humphries

C

anadian military historians generally accept
that during the First World War the Canadian
military improved over time. This idea of a
“learning curve” suggests that Canadians began
the war as inexperienced colonial volunteers and,
as the Corps gained experience on the battlefield,
commanders and ordinary soldiers alike learned
from their mistakes and successes and improved
combat tactics from battle to battle and from
year to year.1 Several different approaches to
this argument are evident in the literature. Tim
Cook and Bill Rawling both published works in
the mid-1990s that argue technology was the
impetus behind this process of learning. On the
other hand, Shane Schreiber, James McWilliams
and R. James Steel have focused on what they
see as the ultimate success of the learning curve:
the August 1918 Battle of Amiens.2 However,
while technology played an important role in the
conduct of the war, and the Battle of Amiens was
indeed a significant Allied victory, one question
remains: where is the hard evidence that this
learning curve exists?

subject in the historiography. In recent years
historians such as such as Andrew Iarocci
and David Campbell have begun to re-examine
training as a means of measuring and evaluating
the learning curve.3 This paper builds on the
work of previous scholars and extends some
of their arguments while challenging others.
It examines the training of the 12th Canadian
Infantry Brigade for the battles of the Somme and
Amiens, as well as the official training manuals,
to look at tactical change over time. It argues
that while combat became more complex and
“all arms” oriented, the basic tactical concepts
of 1916 essentially remained the same in 1918.
Except for terminology and the addition of new
weapons, little changed in how the 12th Canadian
Infantry Brigade was taught to fight between the
Somme and Amiens. Indeed, while new weapons
were utilized and emphasized in training, they
were merely integrated into existing tactical
doctrine and had little appreciable impact on
what was envisioned as the key to battlefield
success.

One of the best ways to find evidence of
“learning,” a largely abstract process, is through
an examination of training. Because training
is meant to impart specific knowledge, during
the Great War written training instructions and
orders were spelled out in minute and explicit
detail and the lessons that were to be learned
from various exercises were highlighted.

*****

While many excellent works have been
produced on the Canadian Expeditionary Force,
there is still room for further scholarship. Until
recently, training has been a sorely neglected

T

he Somme and Amiens are two entirely
different battles – the Somme is generally
considered to be the worst British failure in
the First World War while Amiens is generally
considered to be the Commonwealth’s greatest
victory. Because these two battles are separated
not only by time but also by outcome, they
should, according to the “learning curve”
paradigm, exist at either extreme of the process.
However, there are some similarities. Both
battles began in the summer and both were
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The first day of the Somme was a stereotypical
battle of the Great War. On 1 July 1916 60,000
British soldiers became casualties as they walked
across no-man’s-land into a hail of machine gun
bullets. While it was the quintessential battle
of attrition which was waged, in fits and starts,
until 19 November 1916,4 as the battle dragged
on, soldiers generally were prepared for what
they faced. Indeed, the 12th Brigade prepared
thoroughly before arriving on the Somme.
Above all, training emphasized initiative on
the part of all soldiers (but especially NCOs
and officers), a flexible approach to tactical
problems and the preparation of all ranks for
the unexpected.5 The training of the 12th Brigade
was typical of Canadian preparations for the
Somme and points to what Canadian and British
commanders thought were the keys to victory.
Training in 1916 was not devoted simply to
bayonet and musketry practice. Although these
activities (as well as route marches), were still
seen as important, they were used more to keep
the basic skills of the soldier sharp rather than
to “give him the keys to victory.” Instead, the
training of a Canadian battalion for combat on
the Somme was experiential in nature, utilizing
practice attacks and tactical exercises to drive
home the specific aspects of doctrine that it was
thought would bring about success. The state of
British doctrine in the summer of 1916 is best
explained by an army publication of 8 May 1916,
Stationary Service publication 109 [SS 109]:
Training of Divisions for Offensive Action.6

lessons learned in combat could be incorporated
into the training of battalions. His suggestions
played an important role in the training of the
12th Canadian Infantry Brigade for the Somme.
Kiggell emphasized the need to adequately prepare
an attack, meaning the precise coordination of
artillery bombardments with the advance of the
infantry and the employment of predetermined
tactical schemes designed to capture specific
enemy strongpoints. 7 More importantly, he
suggested:
The conditions of every attack vary, and a special
solution must be found for each individual
problem.…It is impossible to lay down any
definite rules as to the strength of assaulting
columns, the number of lines of which they
consist, or the distance apart of these lines.
The depth of the assaulting column depends
on the distance of the objective, and on the
opposition that has to be overcome in reaching
it. Its strength must be calculated so as to give
sufficient driving power to enable the column
to reach its objective to be held when gained.8

Kiggel went on to speak to the importance of
initiative at all levels of rank. He wrote,
special exercises should be held during the
period of training by divisional and brigade
commanders with all their staffs and subordinate
Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 117875

offensive campaigns initiated by the British.
While the Canadians arrived on the Somme two
months after the campaign began, at Amiens
they took part in the initial assault. In training
for the Somme the Canadians had the benefit of
learning from British experiences earlier in the
campaign. Likewise, in preparing for Amiens
the Canadians had the benefit of learning from
British experiences in open warfare during the
German Spring offensive of 1918.

SS 109, written by Lieutenant-General L.E.
Kiggell of British General Headquarters, posited
several “new” ideas based on experience gained
at the front in 1915 and suggested how these
Canadian soldiers training on the Salisbury
Plain in England march past Stonehenge
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commanders…to consider the action to be
taken by subordinate commanders when local
unexpected situations arise such as occur when a
portion of a line is held up, impassable obstacles
are encountered, or it becomes necessary to
deliver or repel a local counter-attack.…Officers
and men in action will usually do what they have
been practiced to do or have been told to do in
certain situations, and it is therefore all the more
necessary to ensure that a clear understanding
should exist amongst all ranks as to what
action is to be taken in the different situations
that may arise in battle…as …situations will
constantly arise when there is no officer or
non-commissioned officer present with groups
of men, and the men must realize that, in such
a case, one man must assume leadership on the
spot and the remainder act under his control.9

However, Kigell’s advice was not as original
and ground-breaking as it may appear in the
context of 1916. Indeed, these ideas (or at least
their beginnings) can be found in the prewar
training manuals which continued to be in force
throughout the war.
Contrary to the popular belief that the
British used the same uniform attack formations
universally across the Western Front, there was,
at least officially, no universally accepted method
of attack. The official training manual Infantry
Training, 1914 stated:

In no two military operations is the situation
exactly similar. The character of the ground,
the climatic conditions, the extent of the cooperation of the other arms, the strength and
fighting spirit of the opposing forces, their
physical condition and the objects they wish to
achieve must always differ.
It is impossible, therefore, as well as highly
undesirable to lay down a fixed and unvarying
system of battle formations. General principles
and broad rules alone are applicable to the
tactical handling of troops in war.10

Likewise, another important official manual,
Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations,
read:
The conditions which affect the question of the
frontage to be allotted to the various parts of an
attacking force must vary with the circumstances
of each battle. Ground, time conditions, the
information available, the relative value of the
opposing troops, the possibility of gaining a
surprise, are some of the inconstant factors to
be weighed. It is, therefore, neither possible nor
desirable to give more than general indications as
to how the problem is to be solved. The general
principle is that the enemy must be engaged in
sufficient strength to pin him to his ground and
to wear down his power of resistance, while the
force allotted to the decisive attack must be as
strong as possible.11
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From these excerpts we can see that Kigell’s SS
109 echoed the prewar doctrine when it tasked
the battalion commander to organize the soldiers
under his command into the formation that
would be most effective against the unique type
of ground occupied by the enemy. Kigell also
looked to the official Infantry Training, 1914
when he emphasised the importance of initiative
at all levels of rank. Infantry Training, 1914
suggested that training should be designed “to
give [the soldier] confidence in his superiors and
comrades; to increase his powers of initiative,
of self-confidence and of self-restraint; to train
him to obey orders, or to act in the absence of
orders for the advantage of his regiment under
all conditions.”12
Essentially, this comparison between SS 109
and the official prewar manuals suggests that
there was at least as much continuity as change
in official tactical doctrine between 1914 and
1916: in 1916 Kiggell simply reinforced existing
and accepted tactical principals. However, both
the training manuals and SS 109 indicate official
doctrine, not how that doctrine was interpreted
in specific training exercises or at “the sharp end
of the stick” because, as historian Paddy Griffith
suggests, theory and practice in war are two
entirely different things.13 Let us now examine
how these doctrinal principals were interpreted
in training by the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
On 28 August 1916, before the 12th Brigade
went into action on the Somme, the commanding
officer of the brigade, accompanied by battalion
commanders and several senior officers,
attended a “demonstration of various trench
warfare techniques” put on by the Second Army
Central School of Instruction. 14 The trench
warfare demonstration was designed to be a state
of the art example of how an attack on a realistic
German position was to be carried out and how
soldiers should be trained. The demonstration,
as shown in the program given to attendees,
emphasised ten key points:
a) Preparation for attack by bombardment by 2”
and 9.45 cm Trench Mortars
b) Explosion of mine
c) Occupation of crater [created by the mine]
under cover of:d) Barrage put on by Stokes Guns
e) Consolidation of Crater and enemy trenches

f) Smoke screen from Artillery Observation
g) Bombing and blocking of trenches
h) Installation of Snipers’ Posts
i) Intercommunication by aeroplane
j) Intercommunication by amplifier15

The simulated attack was conducted in three
waves. The first wave was to pass over the
“enemy’s” main fire trench and take his support
trench, some 100-200 yards beyond (see Map 1).
The second wave was then to occupy the newlycreated crater and the enemy’s front line. A third
wave would carry forward ammunition, bombs
and supplies and aid in the consolidation of
the two trenches. In this way the battlefield was
divided into three zones of operation: the most
forward zone containing the enemy’s support and
communication trenches (labelled “C” and “D”), a
middle zone consisting of the enemy’s main fire
trench (labelled “B”) and a rearward area from
which the attack was launched (labelled “A”). To
capture and consolidate these positions specific
tactical principles were to be observed.16
The “waves [were to] advance to [the] objective
in parties of ten or less, in single file,” a type of
formation which mirrors the small unit “shock
troop” tactics of 1918.17 As well, in the attack,
specialized squads and sections within the
attacking force itself provided fire support for
the assaulting infantry. The barrage, covering
the advancing troops, was initially conducted by
trench mortars which subsequently assumed
a supporting role, moving forward with the
infantry. The actual assault on the trenches was
completed by the infantry, supported by bombers
and Lewis Gunners.18
The assault itself was a highly coordinated
effort. The first wave was composed of 125
men, and was further subdivided into a series
of groups, each with a specific task. The 50 men
of Force “1” were assigned the task of taking the
support trench and then reversing the parapet
in anticipation of a counterattack. Forces “2”
through “5” were to assist Force “1” in taking
C trench and then each force was to split off
and block the communications trenches at the
following points marked on Map 1: D1, D2,
D3 and D4. Force “5a” was to assist in taking
C trench and then signal the airplanes that the
objective was secured with flare guns. Forces “6”
and “7” were to, again, assist in taking C trench
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and then break off from the main force and clear
the communications trenches from point C.2 to
the “new crater” and from point C.0 to the “old
crater.” These last two forces would then link up
with the second wave which had its attack broken
down by objective in a similar manner.19

map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2005

As the plan suggests, the success of the
assault relied not on masses of men, marching
in time towards an objective, but rather on the
cooperation of small groups which were given

specific and predetermined tasks. In this way,
this simulated attack concentrated training
on the same doctrinal points as had been
emphasized in SS 109 and in the official prewar manuals. As well, we see evidence for what
would later be called “small group tactics,” –
the division of the assaulting force into several
small and independent formations designed to
work in concert towards a common objective.
However, there is an underlying principal that is
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A Canadian Lewis gunner fires
at a German aircraft, July 1917
LAC PA 1416
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suggested by this demonstration that may not be
immediately visible: fire and movement.
While it is not explicitly stated, the success
of the 28 August demonstration attack relied
upon the fact that in order for infantry soldiers
to attack a prepared position over open ground,
the enemy needed to be prevented from “manning
his parapet.” A tactical memorandum prepared
by the General Officer Commanding XIV Corps,
Lieutenant-General Cavan and dated 3 August
1916 described how artillery fire could be used
to cover the advance of the infantry under a
“creeping barrage.”20 However, as subsequent
exercises carried out by the 12th Brigade
indicate, it was also recognized that soldiers in
small groups needed to provide covering fire for
each other.
At the end of September the 12th Brigade
began to train specifically for its upcoming
deployment to the Somme front. During section
and platoon training, while time was allotted for
the men of the brigade to familiarize themselves
with the newly-issued Lee-Enfield rifle in
musketry practice,21 the main emphasis was on
learning to move “in shallow columns [with] rapid
deployment.”22
Because, the term “shallow columns” is used
in the plural, it can be inferred that the platoon
was to be divided into several small columns,
each comprised of a single section of infantry,
similar to the “single file lines” of ten or fewer
soldiers demonstrated on 28 August 1916.
These groups would utilize ground as cover far
more efficiently than could men deployed in a
horizontal line comprised of an entire platoon or
company. These small groups could be controlled
more efficiently than could a company of 120 men
or a platoon of 40 men. This type of formation
also necessitated that command and decision
making power be delegated to the NCOs who
were in command of sections and squads. As
well, this type of deployment was much more
effective against prepared positions.
In instructions to the 38th Battalion, BrigadierGeneral MacBrien wrote, “reserves should not be
wasted in impossible frontal assaults against
strong places but rather be thrown in between
these strong places and [should] work around
them to attack them in the flank and rear.”23

MacBrien ordered that attention be given to
the “avoidance of unnecessary losses owing to
over crowding of trenches after the position has
been consolidated. A system of defence with
machine guns, Lewis guns and small parties of
Infantry will usually suffice.”24 Furthermore, he
instructed, “during these exercises the greatest
importance is to be attached to the issuing of
clear and concise orders…Each man should have
a definite job, and understand it.”25 He suggested
that assaulting formations “practice being held
up at certain [enemy strong] points in the attack
[and that] methods of communications with
artillery [be practiced] with a view to having those
points done in, and [the] reorganization of attack
against these points.”26 These infantry attacks
were to be combined with Lewis gun and Stokes
Mortar teams, commanded at the battalion level
and lower which incorporated into the attack in
a supporting role.27
What MacBrien described are what would
later be termed “infiltration” or “storm troop”
tactics, that is, tactics which allowed small
groups of infantry to penetrate the enemy’s main
line, supported by other infantry and artillery,
to attack enemy positions in their flanks. These
tactics, which would be referred to as “fire and
movement” in the Second World War, required the
advancing infantry to support itself: one group
of infantry would fire in the general area of the
enemy to “keep his head down” while a second
group of infantry rushed forward. This “leap
frog” process would eventually culminate in a
close quarters battle decided by the bayonet, rifle
butt, fists and the grenade. While historians such
as Bruce Gudmundsson and Martin Samuels28
(among many others) would suggest that these
tactics were pioneered by the German army in
1917 and 1918, they were in reality much older.
The official training manual, Infantry
Training, 1914 printed before the beginning of
hostilities discusses the importance of fire and
movement in the attack. It reads,
When the ground permits, it is generally
necessary to detail special detachments of
infantry to provide covering fire for the leading
troops.…in flat country it is impossible for
infantry or machine guns to fire over the heads
of their own troops, and opportunities for
supplying covering fire must be sought on the
flanks. Troops detailed to give covering fire to
others must take care to select as targets those
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bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking
the advance…As soon as their fire ceases to be
effective in aiding the advance of the firing line,
it is the duty of troops detailed to give covering
fire at once to join in the advance.29

Here the manual described the basic principals
of fire and movement: fire is used to promote
and enable movement. The attacking force was
to be divided into an advancing unit and a fireunit.30 The duties of the fire-unit was to cover the
forward movement of the assaulting unit. A 1915
Canadian manual described how the process was
designed to work,
When advancing line is checked, advance will
be made by rushes. Proximity of enemy and
formation of ground govern whether whole line
simultaneously or portions of it alternately will
advance. As a rule portions of line will advance
alternately in rushes to successive halting places.
Length of rush governed by enemy’s fire, physical
condition of troops and available cover.…
Fire and Movement: Object of fire in attack and
counter attack is to facilitate movement, check
or hinder movements of enemy.31

These manuals clearly placed emphasis on small
unit tactics, which necessarily decentralised the
command structure.32 These tactical units were
expected to at least provide some of their own
fire support through the use of trench mortars
and Lewis Guns. The training of 12th Brigade
suggests that these small groups were to close
with the enemy through fire and movement.
None of these concepts were either new or
revolutionary: they are all taken directly from
the prewar field manuals. The basic tactical
principals laid down in the official training
literature remained consistent between the
outbreak of war and the Battle of the Somme.
Indeed, as we shall see, this continuity in tactical
doctrine extended to 1918.
*****

D

uring the spring of 1918, the Canadian
Corps missed the main thrust of the biggest
German offensive since 1914. Because the
Canadians were largely unbloodied, they were
chosen, along with the ANZACs, to lead the first
major Allied counteroffensive in mid-summer
1918. While the Battle of Amiens would prove
to be a major Allied victory and would be
remembered by Eric Luddendorf as “the black

day of the German Army,” the victory was not
the product of new tactical principals. Instead,
as training records demonstrate, the tactics used
at Amiens were essentially the same as those
suggested by the official prewar manuals. As well,
specific tactical training differed little between the
battles of the Somme and Amiens.
Training for what would eventually become
the Llandovery Castle operation began in midspring 1918.33 Like at the Somme, a series of
exercises were set for the 12th Brigade which
were designed to teach tactical concepts. On 6
May 1918, MacBrien issued “‘Delta’ Training
Instruction No 1.” MacBrien wrote, “Owing to the
fact that the Division will have only a few days
to train – (possibly 7) – it is essential that every
available hour be fully occupied in the training of
officers, NCOs and men.”34 Faced with a limited
period of training, it is interesting to note the
activities which were emphasized. MacBrien
wrote:
In training particular attention should be paid
to the following:a)

Day and night marching by compass
bearings (officers and NCOs).

b)

Scouting and patrolling.

c)

Rapid communications (keeping in touch
with flanks).

d)

Musketry (to be carried out with fixed
bayonets):- Rapid fire, fire orders, fire
direction, fire control and description of
targets.

e)

Physical training and bayonet fighting.

f)

The training of specialists – such as Lewis
Gunners and Rifle Grenadiers.…

g)

Sections to be practiced in approaching
an imaginary strong pint, making use of
hedges, ditches, and other cover.

h)

Platoons moving in Section columns
opening to line in extended order. Sections
advancing under supporting fire of other
sections.35

These specific “areas of concentration” were not
groundbreaking by any means. Indeed, bayonet
fighting, night marching, scouting, patrolling,
musketry and physical training were the most
basic elements of infantry training.36 However,
once the “basic” training described above was
completed, the 12th Brigade began to practice
attacks at the company level.

22
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LAC PA 133

Left: A Canadian soldier practices his
musketry skills, June 1916.
Below: Testing a Vickers Machine
Gun, September 1916

When platoons have received
a brushing up in 4h [refers
to the list above] a simple
tactical scheme for the attack
of a company should be carried
out. The attack could be made
on a farmhouse, or two of
them, which would represent
enemy strong points. If ground
is suitable attacks should
start from five hundred yards
from the objective. In these
schemes attention should be
paid to the action of the Lewis
Guns – the use of cover –
initiative of platoon and section
commanders in pushing forward – fire orders
– action of rifle grenadiers.…Platoon must be
practiced in capturing strong points and Machine
Gun positions alone – and in co-operation
with platoons on the flanks. Companies are to
be exercised in clearing up areas containing
several hostile localities. Smoke bombs should
be used.37

The points emphasized in this brief training
syllabus are almost identical to those points
highlighted in both the prewar manuals and
the exercises carried out in preparation for the
Somme. Units were expected to attack in small
groups and operate as sections, not platoons
or companies. Initiative at all levels of rank
was emphasized and the importance of using
ground and cover in the advance was underlined.

LAC PA 635

MacBrien’s instructions
set out just how these practice
attacks were to be carried
out and what points were to
be emphasised. In the same
instruction noted above he
continued,

Basically there seems to be little difference
between this practice attack and the exercises
carried out in August and September of 1916.
This is also true for training carried out later in
the summer by 12th Brigade.
The most detailed training exercise conducted
by the 12th Brigade took place on 5 July 1918.
The instructions issued for the attack read:
Plan of action
I.

OC divides the area into 3 zones and
disposes his trops as under:“C” Company [Coy] to clear OUTPOST
ZONE…
“B” Coy to clear BATTLE ZONE…
“A” and “D” Coy to clear REAR ZONE…

II.

3” Trench Mortars [TM] to follow “B”, “A” and

23
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“D” Coys, and give assistance as required.
III. 6” TMs will be kept as a Battalion reserve
and employed on request for assistance
from companies.
IV. 1 Section Canadian Field Artillery to operate
in area and render assistance by direct
and indirect fire as required by the Bn.
Commander according to situation which
may develop.

V.

Battery of Machine Guns: 1 section on
Slag heep (C.15.a) to deliver covering fire.
1 section to follow infantry to assist with
covering fire and to help hold ground
gained.

VI. 1 Section of Tanks: Held as a reserve in the
first instance owing to the limited number
available, to go forward and deal with points
of opposition which arise.
VII.
Aeroplane: A) to carry
out a reconnaissance and try to
find centres of resistance, dropping
bombs on them. B) report progress
of out most advanced troops from
ground flares.38

map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2005

This is an almost identical
exercise to that carried out on 28
August 1916 in both form and
substance. The division of the
attack’s objectives into three zones
(see Map 2) was quite similar to
the scheme laid out in Map 1. As
on 28 August, the three zones were
to be cleared in a “reverse leap
frog” fashion where the farthest
objective was to be secured first.
The use of trench mortars to
assist in the advance, under
the command of the assaulting
infantry, was exactly the same as
the previous exercise. The use
of the Canadian Field Artillery
section was in accordance with
the suggestions made by Caven
in the summer of 1916. Likewise,
the use of machine guns to provide
covering fire was in accordance
with the provisions of the prewar
field manuals discussed above.
The only major difference between
the 1916 attack and the 1918
attack was the use of tanks and
airplanes in offensive roles.
In reality, tanks were not in
use on the Western Front when
the 1916 demonstration attack
occurred. Airplanes were likewise
not generally able to operate in
an offensive role. By 1918, both
had become commonplace on the
field of battle. However, while their
use in 1918 may appear to have
been innovative, they were actually
24
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employed in a conventional manner, meaning that
these new weapons were merely integrated into
the existing tactical doctrine. In many ways, tanks
and airplanes were used as mobile artillery.
If we look back to the training conducted in
1916, we see that the role of the artillery was, after
the initial barrage, to assist the infantry in dealing
with strongpoints.39 Indeed, this was still the role
of the artillery in 1918 (at least according to 12th
Brigade’s Tactical Scheme No.3). Here we see that
tanks were to be used sparingly and only to deal
with strongpoints. As well, airplanes were to drop
bombs to destroy strongpoints. Basically, while
the weapons delivery system may be different in
1918 than in 1916, the tactical principal guiding
the employment of that weapon remained the
same throughout: infantry were used to advance
and occupy ground; artillery, tanks and airplanes
were used to assist and support the infantry by
dealing with strong points.
The concepts that MacBrien hoped to teach
his soldiers in 1918 were remarkably similar to
the concepts that he emphasized in 1916. The
instructions read,
Lessons which it is desired that the exercise
should teach
1.

The method of overcoming Machine Gun
Defence in depth:

Initiative on the part of platoons
a.
in making use of the ground and in
working forward on the flanks of the enemy
positions.
b.

Infiltration.

c.

Close Liaison.…

First Phase:
a)
Platoon tactics in capturing any points
of resistance left in the enemy’s outpost
zone after our preparatory bombardment
has ceased. Normally this zone is lightly
held but it is necessary to provide for the
capture of whatever may live through out
bombardment.
Re-bombardment of some points
b)
in outpost zone may be necessary but in
this scheme it is taken for granted that the
infantry does not require further assistance
but overcomes the opposition met with by
its own weapons.
Second Phase
c)
Shows the Coy and Platoon tactics in
manoeuvring to outflank and destroy the
enemy positions after having penetrated
where possible into his battle zone,
enfiltration being used
d)
Both Artillery and Trench Mortars
will be moved forward to fire as necessary
to overceom oppostion in this zone
Third Phase
e)

Shows Battalion tactics in dealing

Canadians advancing east of
Arras, September 1918.

LAC PA 3074

25
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 3

with the enemy in the “rear zone”. Coys
give mutual support to one another in the
advance. Platoons engage hostile machine
gun nests with fire. Platoons will work
forward on both flanks before the advance
in the centre commences.40

These “lessons” are almost identical to the
discussion of fire an movement offered above.
Indeed, in 1916 these concepts were more
defined and were discussed in more depth.
Before the Somme MacBrien suggested that
troops not be wasted in “impossible frontal
assaults against strong places but rather be
thrown in between these strong places and work
around them to attack them in the flank and
rear.”41 While the actual term “infiltration” (or
enfiltration) is used in 1918, the concept remains
the same as discussed in 1916 and in the prewar field manuals. Likewise, “Close Liaison” is
merely a new term applied to a concept discussed
in 1916 and in the prewar field manuals: the
use of artillery (and in 1918 tanks and aircraft)

to deal with enemy strongpoints.42 The use of
platoon tactics and the focus of the attack on the
flanks of the enemy, has already been discussed
in some detail both in reference to the prewar
field manuals and training conducted in 1916.
However, it is important to stress that this was
not a new idea: not in 1918 and not in 1916. This
point gets at the heart of the matter.
In Shock Army of the British Empire Shane
Schreiber writes,
the battle of Amiens was not only the beginning
of the end for the German Army on the Western
Front, but also the culmination of technological
and tactical changes that foreshadowed the
development of modern mechanized warfare.…
The British, Australian and Canadian triumph
at Amiens was in fact a story of technological
innovation, tactical metamorphosis and careful,
detailed planning and orchestration that acted
as a harbinger of the sea change [sic] that had
taken place in modern European land warfare
during 1917 and 1918.43

Canadian troops with a tank
move across no-man’s-land.
LAC PA 1496
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But where is the evidence that such a change
took place?
Schreiber writes,
[In the winter of 1918, Canadian] infantry units
continued to incorporate innovative platoon
level tactics into their training, borrowing much
from German “stormtroop tactics” and from
innovations made by others in the British and
French armies, such as Ivor Maxse. This tactical
system focused on small, independent groups of
about 40 soldiers fighting their way to a specific
objective using dispersed formations, the terrain,
support fire and movement to their advantage.
Fire support came in the form of Lewis light
machine guns and other light support weapons,
such as grenades and light mortars. Gone were
the days when waves of infantry charged into a
hail of machine gun fire, replaced instead with
carefully planned, short, sharp dashes under the
cover of vicious, close-range supporting fire.44

As we have seen, not only did these tactical
principles exist in 1916, they are also clearly
described in the prewar manuals. Fire and
movement was not new and neither was the

use of light and heavy automatic weapons for
covering fire.45 The decentralization of command,
necessary for small group tactics, was called
for in the prewar manuals and the use of small
groups of men, working in alternate rushes,
utilizing terrain as cover was clearly important,
both before the war and during training in 1916.46
How then are we to account for this discrepancy,
as Schreiber is only one among many historians
who make similar arguments?47
While it is true that tens of thousands of
British soldiers died on 1 July 1916 on the
Somme, killed by a sleet of machine gun bullets,
it is also true that the Allied armies broke the
German army in the summer and fall of 1918
forcing Ludendorff to call for an armistice on 11
November 1918. Historians, who are trained to
look for “change over time” and then describe
the causal agent behind that change, necessarily
have tried to explain why Allied fortunes altered
so dramatically between 1916 and 1918. The
prevalent Canadian historiography assigns
causality to the “learning curve.”
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Much of the Canadian historiography is
steeped in nationalism and, ultimately, seeks
to prove that the Canadian Corps was the
“best” Allied formation on the western front.
Naturally the myth follows the archetypal hero
story: the Corps, a rag tag bunch of citizen
soldiers, struggles against the inflexible and
conservative regular British Army structure, until
the Canadians are able to come into their own
(despite the cards stacked against them) at Vimy
Ridge and, in doing so, they secure their place at
the front of the 1918 Victory winning offensive
which brings Canada acclaim and the right to
call itself a country separate from Great Britain.
Because the Canadian First World War myth is
essentially about the child (Canada) coming to
the rescue of the parent (Great Britain), central
to the mechanics of the story is the suggestion
that Canada, and not Great Britain, overcame
the riddle of the trenches. Naturally, this myth
focuses on Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps
Commander who led the Canadians after Vimy
Ridge until the end of the war. This myth suggests
that it was under Currie’s leadership that the
Canadian Corps became the “shock army” of the
British Empire. While Currie was an able and
effective Corps Commander, perhaps it is time to
look beyond the Canadian myth to explain what
changed on the Western Front between 1914 and
1918. Perhaps the answer is far more simple than
it seems.

Historians, concerned with change, causative
agents and the capacity of individuals to affect the
course of history, often look beyond the mundane
forces that operate beneath the surface. What is
clear from the above evidence is that continuity
in tactics and training was as notable as change.
However, there was a deadlock on the Western
Front. Indeed, it is often assumed that this
deadlock was the result of a breakdown and
failure in tactical thinking. However, it could be
argued that the same tactics that historians argue
“broke down” in 1914 are hailed as “innovative”
and the “keys to victory” in 1918.
Perhaps it is true that tactics designed to
utilize fire, movement and the enemy’s flanks
were simply useless against a strong enemy
without assailable flanks from 1914 to 1917.
However, by 1918 many other factors were at
work: the German army had been stretched thin
and then failed in its own attempt to “solve the
riddle of the trenches” in the spring of 1918.
This exacerbated the already significant problem
brought about by four years of attritional warfare:
by the summer of 1918 it was apparent that in
only a matter of months, there would simply be no
more Germans to “man the parapet.” Weakened
by blockade and drawing on an ever smaller
resource and manpower pool, the German army
was, in 1918, not able to offer the same level of
resistance as it had earlier in the war. By 1918

LAC PA 40229

Canadians enter the main square in Cambrai, France during the advance east of Arras, October 1918.
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the German army had also resorted to a system
of defence-in-depth, which some historians have
argued was a tactical breakthrough,48 but was
really based on a need to economize defence over
greater distances. Because prewar and mid-war
Allied tactics were designed to attack an enemy
in his flanks, overcoming strongpoints using
small groups of self-supported infantry, this
system may have simply played into Allied hands:
suddenly the Germans, deployed in a network of
strongpoints, had flanks to attack. This helps to
explain why an examinaiton of the training of the
12th Canadian Infantry Brigade between 1916
and 1918 suggests that there was at least as much
continuity as change in the tactics emphasized
during training. Clearly, future case studies of
training must be done to confirm whether this
was a more generalized phenominum.
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